Institutional Ownership and Value Relevance of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: Empirical Evidence from China by Rehman, Ramiz ur et al.
Bryant University 
Bryant Digital Repository 
Accounting Journal Articles Accounting Faculty Publications and Research 
3-16-2020 
Institutional Ownership and Value Relevance of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Disclosure: Empirical Evidence from China 
Ramiz ur Rehman 
Xi'an Polytechnic University 
Zahid Riaz 
Lahore Business School 
Charles Cullinan 




Hebei University of Science and Technology 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/acc_jou 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rehman, Ramiz ur; Riaz, Zahid; Cullinan, Charles; Zhang, Junrui; and Wang, Fanghua, 
"Institutional Ownership and Value Relevance of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: 
Empirical Evidence from China" (2020). Accounting Journal Articles. Paper 139. 
https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/acc_jou/139 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Accounting Faculty Publications and Research at 
Bryant Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Accounting Journal Articles by an authorized 
administrator of Bryant Digital Repository. For more information, please contact dcommons@bryant.edu. 
sustainability
Article
Institutional Ownership and Value Relevance of
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure:
Empirical Evidence from China
Ramiz ur Rehman 1,2,* , Zahid Riaz 3, Charles Cullinan 4, Junrui Zhang 5 and Fanghua Wang 6
1 School of Management, Xi’an Polytechnic University, Xi’an 710048, China
2 Lahore Business School, University of Lahore, Lahore 54100, Pakistan
3 Faculty of Business Administration, Lahore School of Economics, Lahore 53200, Pakistan;
zahidriaz@lahoreschool.edu.pk
4 Department of Accounting, Bryant University, Smithfield, RI 02828, USA; cullinan@bryant.edu
5 Department, School of Management, Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China; zhangjr@mail.xjtu.edu.cn
6 College of Film and Television, Hebei University of Science and Technology, Shijiazhuang 050018, China;
wangfh@hebust.edu.cn
* Correspondence: ramiz_rehman@xpu.edu.cn
Received: 15 February 2020; Accepted: 11 March 2020; Published: 16 March 2020


Abstract: We examine the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and
firm value in China. Using a sample of listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2008
to 2012, we find that market value of a firm is higher when a company makes a lower level of CSR
disclosure. Other things being equal, this relationship becomes positive when the CSR disclosure is
moderated with the institutional ownership. With regard to the CSR disclosure, we found consistent
results with respect to the little evidence that the amount of CSR disclosure is significantly associated
with market value among those companies who chose to provide CSR disclosures. Taken together,
these results indicate that the decision to disclose or not to disclose CSR information is value relevant
to the level of institutional investors. These findings are important as they have made an attempt to
resolve the earlier contradictory findings with respect to the relationship between market value and
CSR disclosure. Furthermore, it has highlighted the value relevance of CSR disclosure regarding the
type of shareholders/institutional investors.
Keywords: disclosure; corporate social responsibility; firm value; institutional investors; China
1. Introduction
A firm may disclose discretionary information to reduce the firm’s cost of capital (Cormier et al.
(2011) [1]; Dhaliwal et al. [2]) and/or increase firm value (Margolis et al. [3]; Cho et al. (2013) [4]; De
Klerk et al. (2015) [5]). The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1994, Chapter 4) [6]
asserts that “increased informative disclosure benefits users by reducing the likelihood that they will
misallocate their capital”. One area of discretionary disclosure is related to information on a company’s
corporate social responsibility (CSR). With respect to CSR disclosure, Reverte (2012) [7] notes that
“CSR reporting is a part of a firm’s communication tools in order to decrease information asymmetries
between managers and investors”. (There is rich literature on the relationship between CSR activities
and firm value (Wang et al. (2017) [8]). Our research focuses on the CSR reporting and firm value.)
CSR notions were first widely discussed in China when Western multinational companies faced
‘anti-sweatshop’ campaigns which opposed supply chain conditions in some developing countries,
including China (Pun 2003) [9]. Zhou (2006) [10] notes that CSR practices began in China during the
mid-1990s. CSR disclosure by Chinese firms is still a relatively recent innovation. In 2008, the Shanghai
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Stock Exchange and China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC,
2011) [11] began to encourage CSR information disclosure. The SASAC (2011, 18) [11] indicates that
state-owned “[e]nterprises... should establish an information releasing mechanism, providing update[d]
and regular information about CSR performance and sustainable development, plans and measures in
carrying out CSR”.
China is no more an exception than other developing economies regarding the recent increase
in CSR disclosure. As per the recent CSR survey of KPMG, there has been a tremendous surge in
CSR disclosure in the Latin Americas followed by the Asia-Pacific, Europe and Middle East and
Africa regions (KPMG, 2017) [12]. This increase in CSR disclosure has intensified the interests among
researchers to examine the relationship between CSR disclosure and firm value.
The studies have been conducted in both developed and developing countries, which have
found a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and market value of the firm (Cochran and
Wood 1984 [13]; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003 [14]; Alloche and Laroche 2005 [15]; De Bakker,
Groenewegen, and den Hond 2005 [16]; Wu 2006 [17]; Nakao et al., 2007 [18]; Clarkson et al., 2011 [19];
Guenster et al., 2011 [20]) [13–20]. Simultaneously, other studies have found negative association
between CSR disclosure and firm value (Wood and Jones 1995 [21]; Paine 2002 [22]; Iwata and Okada
2011 [23]; Barnett and Salomon, 2012 [24]) [21–24]. Furthermore, China has a unique culture and
institutional environment (Chen, Hung, & Wang, 2018) [25], and a business culture that engenders
limited engagement between management and outside stakeholders. De Villiers and van Staden
(2015) [5], de Klerk and de Villiers (2012) [26], and Gray et al. (2001) [27] argue that institutional
and cultural difference among countries can also influence the link between CSR disclosure and firm
performance. These conflicting perspectives and inconsistent findings underline important research
gaps (Isaksson and Woodside 2016) [28].
In order to address the aforementioned gaps, this paper considers the potential outcomes of CSR
disclosure practices of the Chinese firms. In a recent multilevel review of literature, Jamali and Karam
(2018) [29] have argued that CSR in the developing economies is locally embedded and governed by
formal and informal actors. These differentiating factors give rise to the CSR of developing economies
as a distinctive stream of management literature (Jamali and Karam, 2018) [29]; Basu and Palazzo,
2008 [30]. Consequently, we selected China as a relevant context to investigate the link between CSR
disclosure and firm value. Furthermore, the Chinese context can enable us to discern the roles of
formal and informal governance factors regarding CSR disclosure.
We focused on Chinese companies for other reasons as well. For instance, Wang and Chen [8]
argue that the presence of foreign institutional investors can be a key driver behind CSR disclosure
as they may have greater interest in CSR and more power to affect disclosure than smaller local
shareholders. Second, most studies considering the outcomes of CSR disclosures have focused on
developed economies where the notion of CSR has been greatly refined to represent the current
mainstream literature (Jamali and Karam 2018) [29]; Williams and Pei 1999 [31]; Smith, Adhikari,
and Tondkar 2005 [32]; Gray and Bebbington 2007 [33]). Fewer studies have been conducted on CSR
disclosures in developing nations (Haniffa and Cook 2005 [34]; Islam and Deegan 2008 [35]) [34,35],
such as China where there can be distinctive political structure, social norms, and religious environment,
thereby representing both formal and informal factors of governance (Baron and Tang 2009 [36]; Du et
al. 2016 [37]) [36,37]. For example, Marquis et al. (2013) [38] argue that the objective of issuing CSR
reports can include gaining goodwill with the government, which has a more powerful economic
role than in many developed countries. Singh (2017) [39] notes that “Chinese firms are proactively
reaching out to engage government, customers, investors, creditors and suppliers in multifaceted
initiatives to bolster legal compliance, create better brand equity, strengthen financial oversight, and
ensure sound manufacturing principles” [39]. Using a sample of the Chinese listed firms from 2008 to
2012, we found that market value of the firm is lower when a company discloses CSR information than
when a company does make such disclosures. Notwithstanding, this relationship becomes opposite
when more of the shares of the firms are owned by institutional investors. Taken together, these results
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indicate that the decision to disclose or not to disclose CSR information is value relevant to investors,
especially institutional investors.
In the past, some studies have found a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and market
value of the firm (Cochran and Wood 1984 [13]; De Bakker, Groenewegen, and den Hond 2005 [16]).
However, other studies found a negative association between CSR disclosure and firm value (Wood
and Jones 1995 [21]; Paine 2002 [22]; Barnett and Salomon, 2012 [24]; Al-Dah 2018 [40]). Our findings
have addressed these conflicting perspectives and inconsistent findings in the context of a developing
economy (Isaksson and Woodside [28], 2016, Jamali and Karam, 2018 [29]). Very recently, it is argued
that the value relevance of CSR can be better understood through the juxtaposition of theory and
context (Jamali and Karam, 2018 [29]; Windsor, 2019 [41]). It is due to the fact that country specific
conditions are currently shaping CSR. Jamali and Karam (2018) [29] and Windsor (2019) [41] have
argued that CSR in the context of a developing economy should be considered as a distinctive stream.
As a matter of fact, limited efforts have been made to comprehend the CSR in developing economies
and CSR practices have been less formal in these countries (Matten and Moon, 2008 [42]; Jamali and
Mirshak, 2007 [43]; Sajjad and Eweje, 2014 [44]; Jamali and Karam, 2018 [29]). Consequently, we took
the debate of context-dependence CSR forward and our findings confirm that the value relevance of CSR
is contingent upon the level of institutional shareholding in China.
Our research contributes to the literature in the following manner. First, we extend the literature
on the CSR disclosure/firm value relationship (de Villiers and Marques 2016) [45], which has produced
conflicting results (De Klerk, M., de Villiers, C., and van Staden, C. 2015 [5]; de Klerk and de Villiers,
2012 [27]; Murray et al. 2006 [46]; Schadewitz and Niskala, 2010 [47]) across both developed and
developing economies. Second, we demonstrate whether the CSR disclosure/firm value relationship
can be influenced by any other extraneous factors, such as the extent of institutional shareholding.
Our findings confirm the notion that Chinese firms are willing to incur the marginal cost of increasing
disclosure if there is substantial economic interaction between the institutional investors and firms. It
is imperative to mention that in recent times institutional shareholding has become more prevalent
in China (Jiang and Kim 2015) [48], and institutional investors may have more concern about CSR
disclosures than other types of investors (Wang and Chen 2017) [8].
2. Theory and Hypotheses
2.1. CSR Disclosure and Financial Markets
Agency theory suggests that the proper functioning of capital markets can be impaired if there
is information asymmetry due to inadequate disclosure (Beaver, 1998 [49]; Diamond & Verrecchia,
1991 [50]). Monitoring by the shareholders (the principals in agency theory) can be improved through
frequent and consistent disclosure of information, and disclosures can enable shareholders to manage
conflicts of interest in an agency relationship (Gilson & Kraakman, 1984 [51]; Merton, 1987 [52];
Thévenoz & Bahar, 2007:19 [53]) [51–53]. An effective monitoring through disclosure can decrease the
firm’s cost of capital and enable shareholders to more effectively assess risk and make investment
decisions (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991 [50], (Healy and Pelepu 2001) [54]. More disclosure can
also reduce managerial opportunism and market failures (Cooper & Keim, 1983 [55]; Eisenhardt,
1989 [56]) [55,56].
There has been an increase in the level of CSR disclosure for many companies in present times,
which often results from regulatory interventions (Jain, Aguilera, & Jamali, 2017 [57]; Qian & Schaltegger,
2017 [58]; Shabana, Buchholtz, & Carroll, 2017 [59]) [57–59]. The empirical literature provides mixed
results with respect to the impact of the disclosure of CSR information on the share prices. For
instance, Lorraine et al. (2004) [60] suggest companies that disclose negative environmental and
social information experience decline in share prices, but the share price does not react to positive
CSR information. However, Curran and Moran (2007) [61] found no relationship between deletion
or inclusion of a firm on the FTSE4Good UK Index and financial returns. In the context of emerging
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economies, research also finds conflicting results regarding the value relevance of CSR disclosure and
presents a need for further research (Chen et al., 2018 [25]; de Klerk et al., 2015 [5]; Jain et al., 2017 [57];
Wang, Dou, & Jia, 2016 [62]).
A recent literature review of CSR disclosure has found that the concerns of key local stakeholders,
including regulators, shareholders, institutional investors, creditors, environmentalists, and the media,
are considered very significant regarding the level of CSR information disclosure in developed
economies (Ali, Frynas, & Mahmood, 2017) [63]. However, the CSR disclosure in developing economies
is related to non-local actors, such as international buyers, institutional/foreign investors, international
media, and supra-national regulatory bodies (Ali et al., 2017) [63]. In the case of China, the notion of
CSR disclosure became popular in 2008 and research has produced mixed results on the antecedents and
outcomes of such disclosure in China (Chen et al., 2018 [25]; Cheng, Lin, & Wong, 2016 [64]). Focusing
on antecedents, Li, Luo, Wang and Wu (2013) [65] found that companies with stronger financial
performance disclose more CSR information, and this relationship was stronger for non-state-owned
enterprises. With regard to outcomes of CSR disclosure, Ye and Zhang (2011) [66] found a U-shaped
relationship between CSR disclosure and costs of debt financing in China. In this backdrop, we
examine the value relevance of CSR information in China and explore how the level of institutional
shareholding can impact the value relevance of CSR disclosure.
2.2. Value Relevance of CSR Disclosure
Due to a recent surge in CSR disclosure, researchers have started to ascertain the value relevance
of CSR disclosure by examining the direct link between market value of a firm and CSR disclosure.
Some studies have examined the relationship between CSR disclosure and financial performance/firm
value have found a positive link (for details see, e.g., Cochran and Wood, 1984 [13]; Orlitzky, Schmidt,
and Rynes 2003; Alloche and Laroche 2005 [14]; De Bakker, Groenewegen, and den Hond 2005 [16];
Wu 2006; Nakao et al., 2007 [17]; Clarkson et al., 2011 [19]; Guenster et al., 2011 [20]). Although,
other studies do not find a positive relationship (for details see, e.g., Wood and Jones 1995 [21]; Paine
2002 [22]; Iwata and Okada 2011 [23]; Barnett and Salomon, 2012 [24]).
Even the recent studies have found inconsistent results regarding the value relevance of CSR
disclosure (for details see Cho et al. 2015 [67]; Cahan et al. 2016 [68]; de Villiers and Marques
2016 [45]; Plumlee et al. 2015 [69]). Furthermore, these studies argue that the relationship between
CSR disclosure and firm value can be contingent on an institutional context. For instance, de Villiers
and Marques (2016) [45] found that the CSR disclosure and market value relationship is stronger in
developed economies due to robust market and non-market institutions. These countries have usually
strong democratic governance systems, a market-oriented regulatory regime, and more freedom of
expression. They posit that this stronger relationship is related to the greater ability of investors to voice
their concerns, thereby leading to investor protection through increased disclosure and transparency.
Conversely, Cahan et al. (2016) [68] found that unanticipated CSR disclosure is positively related with
the firm value in the context of weaker national institutions. Furthermore, Islam et al. (2008) [35]
has found that the domestic Chinese companies often disclose anti-bribery information in their CSR
reports to generate their social capital. As China has introduced several initiatives for the regulation of
CSR in 2008, consequently, it is very relevant to investigate the value relevance of CSR disclosure in the
context of China.
Generally, the empirical evidence provides greater support that companies of better financial
performance and cash flows make higher levels of CSR disclosure. The value relevance of CSR
disclosure demonstrates that better performing firms are willing to commit more resources for CSR
activities and their disclosure (Peloza 2009 [70], p. 1518). According to the theory of slack resources,
the other strand of literature, however, argues that firms with better financial performance preferred
to spend these resources for CSR activities, thereby confounding the link between CSR and firm
performance (Waddock and Graves, 1997 [71]). Besides, it has been argued that firms in financial
distress may have little intention to invest in CSR and therefore denote better performance as the
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antecedent of more CSR (McGuire et al., 1990 [72]; Godfrey et al., 2009 [73]). This argument was
examined in the context of a developing economy—Ghana—and Julian and Ofori-dankwa (2013) [74]
found that better performing firms were allocating less resources for CSR activities. Similarly, a
meta-analysis study of Wang et al. (2016) [62] did not find any support in the favor of slack resources
theory of CSR, thereby rejecting the notion of reverse causality between the financial performance and
CSR performance of the firm. Moreover, recent studies of value relevance of CSR disclosure mostly
found that greater disclosure is associated with higher market value of the firms (for details see, Cahan
et al. 2016 [68]; de Villiers and Marques 2016 [45]; Wang et al. 2016 [62]; Ali et al., 2017 [63]; Plumlee
et al. 2015 [69]). In the light of the above discussion, we propose a positive, direct, and significant
relationship between CSR disclosure and market value of firms.
Hypothesis 1: The disclosure of CSR is positively related with the market value of the firm.
2.3. Institutional Shareholding and Value Relevance of CSR Disclosure
Recent research has begun to consider the role of institutional investors in the CSR disclosure/firm
value relationship (Cho et al. 2015 [67]; Cahan et al. 2016 [68]; de Villiers and Marques 2016 [45]). For
example, de Villiers and Marques (2016) [45] found that the CSR disclosure/market value relationship
is stronger in developed economies, which they suggest it is related to the greater ability of investors
to voice their concerns, thereby leading to investor protection through increased disclosure and
transparency. Due to their larger shareholding and influence, it has been argued that institutional
investors can have a greater voice in demanding more CSR disclosure (Solomon and Solomon, 2006 [75];
Solomon, Solomon and Norton, 2002 [76]).
Institutional investors may be one of the factors that can enhance the CSR disclosure and firm
value relationship. In the context of the UK, disclosure about environmental information (a subset of
CSR disclosure) is considered relevant by both institutional and individual shareholders (Solomon and
Solomon, 2006 [75] (de Villiers and van Staden, 2010 [77]). Some research suggests that CSR disclosure
can reveal the current strategies and preparedness of firms and therefore assist institutional investors in
making better projections of future cash flows and earnings (de Klerk, de Villiers, van Staden, 2015) [5].
Likewise, more CSR disclosure can appeal to institutional investors who typically have longer term
investment horizons (Dhaliwal et al., 2011 [2]; de Klerk, de Villiers, van Staden, 2015 [5]).
In early 2008, the China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the State General
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) began to permit foreign institutional investors access to
the Chinese equity markets. Institutional investors have increased their holdings of Chinese shares
and these investors are the main driving force of CSR disclosures in China because individual and
Chinese retail investors have little knowledge about CSR (Wang and Chen 2017 [8]); Jiang and Kim
2015 [48], Lin, 2010 [78]. In this regard, the empirical evidence suggests that institutional investors
seem to be more vigilant towards the CSR-related actions of Chinese firms and therefore they value
CSR disclosure (Firth et al. 2016 [79]; Peng et al. 2013 [80]; Wang et al., 2017 [8]).
As mentioned earlier, better disclosure of CSR activities can assist firms to address the issue of
information asymmetry and enable them to better assess risk and value equities (Cho et al., 2013 [4]; de
Klerk, de Villiers, van Staden, 2015 [5]). Institutional investors may have the knowledge and interest in
CSR disclosure and the long-term perspective to see the value in CSR activities. We therefore propose
that institutional investors can moderate the relationship between CSR disclosure and firm value—the
CSR disclosure/firm value relationship may be stronger when institutional investors hold more of a
firm’s shares. Our second hypothesis is therefore proposed in the following manner.
Hypothesis 2: Institutional shareholding positively moderates the relationship between CSR disclosure and
firm value.
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3. Research Design
3.1. Sample
The initial sample consisted of all Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from
the period 2008 to 2012. Our sample starts in 2008 when the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission and the Shanghai Stock Exchange began to encourage companies to disclose
CSR information. The financial data of the sample companies A-share were collected from China Stock
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR). Due to different reporting requirements, we have excluded
firms that belong to the financial industry (Haniffa and Cook, 2005 [34]; Qi et al., 2013 [65].
Data were taken from the CSMAR database. The details of the sampling process are summarized
in Table 1. The sample was divided into two categories: firms that disclose CSR (DCSR firm-years)
and those that did not disclose CSR information (NDCSR firm-years). Panel A indicates that the total
percentage of CSR-disclosing firm for all years is 18.13% (1835/10,118). This percentage is lower than
comparable percentages in developed countries, such as the 41.1% disclosure rate among US firms
found by Holder-Webb et al. (2009) [81], and the 53% disclosure rate among the largest 100 companies
of 22 countries in 2008 reported by KPMG (2011) [12]. Since 2008, Chinese stock exchanges and the
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission have encouraged disclosure of CSR
performance for Chinese firms. The number of Chinese-listed companies reporting CSR information
increased from 168 in 2008 to 535 in 2012. The different relative power of institutional shareholders
in China, the distinctive cultural/political environment in China, and explicit encouraging of CSR
disclosure in China, make the Chinese context an appropriate context in which the impact of voluntary
CSR disclosure on firm value can be examined. This increasing trend of CSR can be observed in Table 1
over the years from 2008 to 2012. The percentage of companies disclosing CSR information increased
from 10.42% in 2008 to 22.35% in 2012. The distribution of the sample as per the industry category is
presented in Panel B of Table 2.
Table 1. Panel A: Year-wise sample distribution.
Year DCSR NDCSR Total
2008 168 1443 1611
2009 176 1572 1748
2010 439 1642 2081
2011 517 1768 2285
2012 535 1858 2393
Total 1835 8283 10,118
3.2. Dependent Variable and Empirical Model
To examine the potential relationship between CSR disclosure and market value of the firm, this
study follows the Ohlson valuation theory model (1995) [82]. In his contribution, Ohlson asserts that
the expected earnings of a firm can be predicted though accounting earnings and the value of relevant










+ β2DCSRi,t + β3SOEi,t + β4InstSHi,t
+β5 SOE X DCSRi,t + β6InstSH X DCSRi,t +
n∑
j
β jCi,t + µi + εi
(1)
where MVi, t+1 is a market value of ith firm at t+1 time period,
BVi,t−1
TAi,t−1
is the ratio of book value to total
asset of ith firm at t-1 time period, NIi,tTAi,t−1 is the ratio of firm net income at time period t to total assets at
t-1, and DCSRi,t is a dummy variable which measures whether the firm discloses CSR information. The
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DCSR variable takes the value of 1 if the firm discloses CSR information, and 0 otherwise. The DCSR
variable is used to test Hypothesis 1, which posits a positive relationship between CSR information
disclosure and firm market value. InstSHi,t is the percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders.
We interact the InstSHi,t variable with the DCSR variable to test Hypothesis 2, which suggests that
the CSR disclosure/firm value relationship is stronger when institutional shareholders own more of
the firm’s shares. SOE (State Owned Enterprise) is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm is a
state-owned enterprise, and 0 if the firm is not state-owned. SOE is included in this study as a control
variable. Beginning in 2008, SOEs were encouraged by the Chinese State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission (SASAC) to follow good CSR practices and to report on their CSR
activities (SASAC, 2011) [11].
Table 2. Panel B: Sample distribution.
Industry Name DCSR NDCSR Total % of DCSR
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 34 178 212 16
Coal, oil and gas, mining services 77 130 207 37
Cement, textiles, sugar, food, beverages, cooking oil 360 2098 2458 15
Chemical raw materials and chemical products 111 592 703 16
Electronic components 55 340 395 14
Non-metallic minerals 55 266 321 17
Black metal smelting and rolling processing 59 105 164 36
Non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing 81 123 204 40
Petrochemical and other industrial specialized equipment 82 402 484 17
Transportation equipment 71 364 435 16
Electrical machinery and equipment 81 378 459 18
Pharmaceutical 90 426 516 17
Power, steam, hot water production and supply industry 83 261 344 24
Construction 39 159 198 20
Transportation industry 100 244 344 29
Computer application services 123 665 788 16
Tobacco and household goods, energy, materials 88 467 555 16
Real estate 123 442 565 22
Scientific research, health care, tourism, social services 38 284 322 12
Information dissemination, publication communication 17 88 105 16
Comprehensive industries 68 271 339 20
Total 1835 8283 10,118
We also include a variety of control variables in our firm value models. Ci,t represents the other
control variable, such as firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of total assets.
Model 2
In addition to measuring whether the company discloses CSR information or not (in Model 1), we









+ β2CSRScorei,t + β3SOEi,t + β4InstSHi,t
+β5 SOE X CSRScorei,t + β6InstSH X CSRScorei,t +
n∑
j
β jCi,t + µi + εi
(2)
Firms may have differing levels of disclosures in their CSR reports. Categories of disclosures
include worker safety, system construction, public relations, environmental protection, customer
protection, delivery protection, staff protection, creditor protection, and shareholder protection. A CSR
score was developed based on the extent of CSR disclosures. If a firm discloses one CSR item, it is
coded as 1 and if the firm discloses all the possible items, the CSR score is coded as 10. As with Model
1, we also tested this model using the log of market value as the dependent variable.
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4. Results and Findings
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the sample companies are presented in Table 3. The mean market value to
total assets of the full sample is 2.2, with a minimum and maximum value of 0.28 and 1.40, respectively.
The average (logged) firm size is 21.62, which is consistent with Qi et al., 2013 [65].
Table 3. Descriptive statistics—full sample.
Variable Mean Min Max Std. Dev.
Market Value to Asset 2.2 0.28 9.9 1.40
BV to Asset 0.53 −0.53 0.998 0.26
Net Income to Asset 0.06 −2.39 8.44 0.24
Size 21.62 14.10 27.85 1.26
CSR Disclosure * 19% 0 1
CSR Score 1.46 0 10 3.09
State Owned Ent. ** 48% 0 1
Institutional Shareholding 8.26 0 78.01 12.82
Board Size 8.69 0 18 2.35
Independent Director 3.1 0 8 0.86
Note: * The percentage of firms in the total sample which make CSR disclosures. ** The percentage of firms which
are state owned enterprises in the sample.
We present comparisons of means in Table 4. Most of the variables are different between the
DCSR (CSR disclosing) and NDCSR (non-CSR disclosing) sub-samples. For example, the mean market
value of DCSR firms is significantly greater than NDCSR firms. The mean values of net income, book
value, and size of DCSR firms are also significantly higher for DCSR than for NDCSR firms. The mean
values of board size and independent director are also higher for DCSR than for NDCSR firms.
Table 4. Comparison of means.
Variable DCSR NDCSR t-Test P-Value
Mean Mean
MVTA 0.59 0.72 7.48 0.000 ***
NITA 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.8732
BVTA 1.76 2.19 0.25 0.7977
Size 22.58 21.39 −38.51 0.000 ***
Board Size 9.30 8.55 −12.31 0.000 ***
Independent Director 3.40 3.09 −13.62 0.000 ***
Note: * in RMB in 100 Million. *** Significance at 1% level of significance.
Table 5 presents the pair-wise Pearson product–moment correlation coefficients of the variables.
It includes all of the observations and the CSR disclosure measure is based on a dichotomous measure
of whether the firm discloses CSR or not. Gujarati (2009) [83] and Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) [84]
indicate that statistical problems which are created by collinearity and singularity can take place at a
higher bivariate correlation of 0.90 and above. The correlation coefficient values show that there is no
serious problem of multicollinearity because all the correlation coefficients are less than 0.90. Variance
inflation factors (VIFs) and tolerance values for each variable are also computed and shown in Table 5.
The VIFs and tolerance values indicate no material concerns with multicollinearity; the VIFs are below
10 and the values of tolerance were greater than 0.10.
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Table 5. Pairwise correlation.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Variance Inflation Factor Tolerance
1 MV to total asset 1
2 BV to total asset −0.4119 *** 1 1.46 0.685
3 NI to total Asset 0.4000 *** 0.0754 *** 1 1.18 0.845
4 DCSR −0.0886 *** 0.1029 *** 0.0684 *** 1 1.89 0.528
5 Board size −0.0839 *** 0.0991 *** 0.0091 0.1258 *** 1 1.10 0.912
6 SOE −0.0769 *** 0.0622 *** −0.1222 *** 0.1254 *** 0.1698 *** 1 1.20 0.831
7 InstSH 0.1685 *** 0.0067 0.3407 *** 0.1272 *** 0.0868 *** −0.0295 ** 1 1.60 0.625
8 InstSH * CSR disclosure 0.0596 *** 0.0176 0.1771 ** 0.6052 ** 0.1033 ** 0.0670 ** 0.4490 ** 1 2.15 0.464
9 Size −0.3811 ** 0.5461 ** −0.0169 0.3687 ** 0.2574 ** 0.3476 ** 0.1951 ** 0.2550 ** 2.01 0.497
*** Significant at p < 0.01; ** significant at p < 0.05; and * significant at p < 0.10.
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4.2. Regression Results: Disclosing or not Disclosing
Table 6 presents the results of panel data regression models with random and fixed effect. In these
models, the dependent variable is firm value divided by total assets. In the fixed effect model, the table
shows the empirical evidence of [82]’s accounting-based valuation model, in which the coefficient of
net income to total assets is 0.23, significant at 1% level of significance with an R2 of 21%, indicating that
the firm’s accounting earnings predict the expected market value of that firm. The coefficient of DCSR
of -0.136 is significant at 1%. This result is not consistent with Hypothesis 1 (H1) and suggests that
firms disclosing CSR information have lower market values. The institutional shareholding (InstSH)
and its interaction with DCSR variables test H2. The coefficients on InstSH are significant at 1%, and
the coefficient on the InstSH * DCSR interaction variable is significant at 5%, supporting H2, which
posited that institutional shareholding would strengthen the CSR disclosure firm value relationship.
Table 6. Panel regression—market value to total asset—full sample.
Items Random Effect Fixed Effect GMM
Constant
4.67 9.41 3.64
(24.84 ***) (21.94 ***) (9.37 ***)
BV/TA_1 −0.078 0.169 −0.248
(−7.30 ***) (11.99 ***) (−4.47 ***)
NI/TA_1 0.228 0.227 0.212
(37.90 ***) (31.86 ***) (14.20 ***)
DCSR
−0.0958 −0.136 −0.065
(−4.49 ***) (−5.52 ***) (−3.34 ***)
BS
−0.009 −0.002 −0.0002
(−2.49 **) (−0.47) (−0.09)
SOE
0.209 0.013 0.112
(11.28 ***) (0.31) (6.94 ***)
InstSH
0.005 0.007 0.004
(7.59 ***) (9.05 ***) (5.03 ***)
InstSH * DCSR
0.003 0.002 0.004
(3.00 ***) (2.06 **) (3.30 ***)
Size
−0.154 −0.365 −0.112









Hausman Test Chi-Sq (p-value) 2614.42 (0.000)
Hansen –J Chi-Sq (p-value) 0.070 (0.7912)
Note: *,**, and *** are the level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Endogeneity is well documented in research that examines the association between market value
and CSR disclosure (Cavaco and Crifo, 2014 [85]). The generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimator cannot only assist to address the issue of endogeneity, but it can control for the underlying
heterogeneity and simultaneity issues related to the CSR disclosure/market value relationship. In
comparison to the conventional effect estimates, the GMM technique allows CSR disclosure scores
to be affected by the financial performance of the past years (Cavaco and Crifo, 2014, p. 3329 [85]).
Furthermore, the GMM methodology facilitates the use of internal instrumental variables. The use of
the GMM estimator helps to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity for examining the link between
financial performance and CSR, as argued by Belu and Manescu (2013) [86]. In order to ensure the
validity of instruments used by the GMM system, the Hansen’s J test of over-identification can be used.
Due to usage of multiple lag variables as instruments under the GMM technique, the validity of these
instruments can be verified through the above-mentioned test (Hansen 1982 [87]; Cavaco and Crifo,
2014, p. 3330 [85]).
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The results of GMM, where the number of moments are more than the number of parameters,
are presented in Table 6. In order to check for the over identification, the Hansen’s J test of over
identification restrictions has been performed as well. Table 6 indicates that the p-value is insignificant
and over-identification restrictions are valid. Hence, the usage of the GMM technique is appropriate
for the specification of the model.
The results in Table 6 for GMM show that the coefficient for net income as the proportion of total
assets is positively related with the market value to total assets (β = 0.221, p < 0.01). However, there is
negative impact of total book value as the proportion of total assets on the market value to total assets
(β = −0.248, p < 0.01). These results indicate that accounting measures of firms predict the market
value of the firms as per Ohlson’s (1995) accounting-based valuation model. For Hypothesis 1, we
found firms which provide CSR disclosure have lower market value (β = −0.065, p < 0.01). With regard
to Hypothesis 2, we found a positive coefficient for the interaction variables between institutional
ownership and disclosure of CSR information (InstSH*DCSR) (β =0.004, p < 0.01) as shown in Table 5
for GMM. This result indicates that firms with higher levels of institutional shareholding that disclose
CSR have higher market values. These findings support Hypothesis 2, which postulates that the
relationship between market value of the firm and the existence of CSR disclosure is moderated by
institutional shareholding. In order to examine the unique impact of the above-mentioned explanatory
variables on the market value of the firm, board size and status of firms as state-owned enterprises
have been controlled in this research. The board size is negatively related with the market value
of the firm, whereas state-owned enterprises have higher market value of the firm than non-state
owned enterprises.
4.3. Robustness Check—Extent of CSR Disclosure
To examine the potential relationship between CSR disclosure and firm value, we also considered
the extent of disclosure, not just whether there was disclosure or not. Table 7 presents some descriptive
statistics on the type of information disclosed by those firms that chose to make CSR disclosures. The
most common types of disclosures in 2012 involved environmental protection, staff protection, and
shareholder protection initiatives. Based on this information, we developed a CSR score variable that
ranges in value from 1 to 10 based on the number of disclosure items included in the firm’s CSR report.
Table 7. CSR item disclosure percentage.
Disclosure Items 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Deficiency 3% 4% 5% 5% 5%
Worker Safety 8% 8% 18% 19% 19%
System Construction 5% 5% 6% 10% 7%
Public Relations 10% 10% 20% 21% 21%
Environmental Protection 10% 10% 21% 22% 22%
Customer Protection 10% 10% 20% 22% 21%
Delivery Protection 8% 8% 15% 17% 17%
Staff Protection 10% 10% 21% 22% 22%
Creditor Protection 8% 7% 13% 14% 14%
Shareholder Protection 10% 10% 21% 22% 22%
CSR Score Min * 89.5% 89.8% 78.9% 77.5% 77.7%
CSR Score Max * 1.1% 1.8% 3.2% 2.9% 3.4%
* CSR score ranges from 1 to 10. Min CSR scores means a firm only discloses one item of CSR and achieves a CSR
score of 1. Similarly, if a firm discloses all ten items of CSR in its financial report then it can achieve a maximum CSR
score of 10.
We present the results of testing the extent of disclosure in Table 8 (MV/TA (market value to total
asset) as the dependent variable). In these models, only those companies that chose to disclose at
least some CSR information (1441 firm-years) are included and the DCSR variable is replaced with
the CSR score. The extent of disclosure (CSR score) is marginally significant (at the 5% level) and
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negative in the fixed effect model. The institutional shareholding interaction variable is also significant
at 5%. These results, taken together with those presented in Table 6, indicate that greater disclosure
does not appear to have an incremental positive influence on firm value, unless firms have larger
institutional shareholdings.
Table 8. Panel regression—market value to total asset—disclosed sample.
Items Random Effect Fixed Effect
Constant
2.02 8.23
(7.68 ***) (7.11 ***)
BV/TA_1 −0.498 −0.176
(−22.40 ***) (−5.17 ***)
NI/TA_1 0.156 0.210
(15.27 ***) (14.29 ***)
CSR Score
−0.074 −0.127






(5.73 ***) (4.12 ***)
InstSH * CSR Score
0.013 0.024






(−3.67 ***) (−5.81 ***)
No. of Observations 1441 1441
R2 0.6125 0.4037
Model Test Stat 1543.31 75.52
Prob 0.0000 0.0000
Hausman Chi-Sq (p-value) 239.31 (0.000)
Hansen Chi-Sq (p-value)
Note: *,**, and *** are the level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
4.4. Robustness Testing: Matched-pairs Sample
To control for the potential characteristics of companies that may be associated with both the
decision to disclose CSR information and the firm’s market value, we also used a matched-sample design.
For each DCSR firm-year, we identified a NDCSR firm-year based on the following characteristics: (1)
the NDCSR matched company was from the same year as the DCSR firm, (2) the NDCSR matched firm
was in the same industry as the DCSR firm, (3) the NDCSR matched company was within ± 25% of the
DCSR firm size. Based on these criteria, we were unable to obtain matches for 296 DCSR companies.
The results of testing the firm value model on the matched sample are presented in Table 9. The
results of our testing using the matched-sample design are in accord with the results of the non-matched
sample. The results show that firm value is higher for firms that chose to disclose more CSR information
in the presence of institutional investors.
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Table 9. Panel regression—market value to total asset—matched sample.
Items Random Effect Fixed Effect
Constant
0.143 5.60
(3.60 ***) (10.96 ***)
BV/TA_1 −0.359 −0.146




















(−19.84 ***) (−10.51 ***)
No. of Observations 2757 2757
R2 0.4819 0.3460
Model Test Stat 1573.37 33.01
Prob 0.00 0.00
Hausman Chi-sq (p-value) 377.77 (0.000)
Note: *,**, and *** are the level of significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
5. Implications and Conclusions
We examined the prevalence of CSR disclosures in China and the potential relationship between
CSR information disclosure and the market value of the Chinese listed firms. We have chosen China to
investigate value relevance of CSR due to the transition of China from a closed economy to a relatively
open economy. This choice of the Chinese context permits us to contribute towards the notion of
context-dependence of CSR, particularly in the context of a developing economy (Jamali and Karam,
2018 [29]; Windsor, 2019 [41]). The awareness and activities of CSR are in a more formative stage in
China than the developed economies (Wang et al. 2016 [62]; Ali et al. 2017 [63]). We examined the
value relevance of CSR disclosures of Chinese firms from 2008 (when CSR disclosure began to be
encouraged) to 2012. During this time period, there has been a material increase in CSR disclosure; the
numbers of firms who make CSR disclosures has been doubled over the period 2008–2012. There has
been only the increase in the number of firms that make CSR disclosures and the CSR-disclosing firms
have provided more information about their CSR. The main aspects of CSR disclosure are related to
the protection of environment, employees, and shareholders. These findings regarding the types of
CSR resonate with the survey by KPMG that has recognized China as one of the leading economies of
the Asia-Pacific region for CSR disclosure (KPMG, 2013) [88].
In this study, we have found that there is a negative relationship between firm value and CSR
disclosure. Our finding is consistent with the following studies which have found a negative association
between CSR disclosure and market value of the firm (Wood and Jones 1995 [21]; Paine 2002 [22];
Barnett and Salomon, 2012 [24]; Al-Dah 2018 [40]). Furthermore, these results are also consistent
with [54] argument that higher level of CSR disclosure may be exploited by the external stakeholders
to reduce the value of firm. Ye and Zhang (2011) [66] also suggest that firm value may decline at
very high levels of disclosure. Moreover, we have examined the relevance of an important boundary
condition, i.e., interaction between CSR disclosure and institutional shareholding in the context of
China. The inclusion of such a context-specific phenomenon is consistent with the recent debate about
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the context-dependency of CSR. Furthermore, it is argued by Matten and Moon (2008) [42], Jamali and
Mirshak (2007) [43], Sajjad and Eweje (2014) [44], and Jamali and Karam (2018) [29] that there is a dearth
of research regarding CSR in the context of developing economies. We filled these important gaps
through this study. In this regard, our finding about the link between market value and interaction
of CSR disclosure with institutional shareholding demonstrates that firms with higher institutional
shareholding exhibit a positive link between market value and CSR. Hence, this important finding
demonstrates that CSR disclosure is value relevant in those firms of a developing country in which
institutional investors hold substantial ownership stakes.
The Ohlson model suggests that firms disclose information because disclosure can reduce
information asymmetry between agents (managers) and principals (shareholders), and this model
was the basis for our analyses. The reduction in the agency problem can enable investors to make
appropriate assessments of cash flows and earnings, and can thereby increase the market value of those
firms who make CSR disclosures to reduce information asymmetry. We extend the research on value
relevance of CSR disclosures by considering the moderating role of institutional investors. We found
a positive and significant relationship between the interaction of CSR disclosure and institutional
shareholding and market value of the firm. This finding implies that CSR disclosure may be used more
by institutional investors than the non-institutional investors (i.e., CSR disclosures are more value
relevant to institutional investors). These findings are important for China, because the prevalence
and role of institutional investors has evolved in China during recent times (Jiang and Kim 2015) [48].
Most of these institutional investors are foreign investors and these foreign investors may encourage
more CSR activities in China (Lin 2010) [78].
In summary, our results indicate that shareholders reward firms for disclosing CSR information
and this type of disclosure has higher value relevance. Furthermore, the value relevance of CSR
disclosure is greater for institutional investors than for non-institutional investors. These findings are
consistent with the notion that institutional investors are giving more importance to CSR disclosure
from emerging economies like China. For the managers, our results imply that Chinese firms can
benefit from conducting CSR activities due to the high value relevance of CSR disclosure.
This research has conducted an analysis of the value relevance of CSR disclosure from 2008 to
2012. Future studies can extend these time periods to capture the historic trends of CSR disclosure
in China. Furthermore, this study has only examined the relevance of institutional investors, but
future studies can include other types of investors and measure their preferences for different aspects
of CSR disclosure. Future research may conduct a comparative analysis among developed and
developing economies for better insights regarding the value relevance of CSR disclosure. For now,
these results imply the value relevance of CSR disclosure in the context of the Chinese economy and
especially the value relevance of CSR disclosure is more in those firms who have higher levels of
institutional shareholding.
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